Power Sharing in Afghanistan-an interesting proposition

The political climate in Afghanistan is certainly not known for collaboration or  compromise between rivals.  Centuries of tribalism and decades of war make this country one of factionalism; a culture that Afghans know well. But the emergence of two powerful political leaders willing to share the national responsibilities, well it is at a minimum, an interesting proposition. Since before the elections in April 2014, both Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah had been embattled in a fierce public fight for the highest position in the post-Karzai period. Each man was a frontrunner in the general election but with so many candidates, no winner could be identified. A runoff was scheduled for June 2014 to determine which of the two candidates reached the minimum 50% margin to become the president who represented Afghanistan’s democratic transition of power. (Given the history of this country, the mere fact that an election was held to decide the next president gave witness to the world that there was a desire for political stability.)  The runoff was said to indicate Ghani was the winner.  Unfortunately the intrigue of voter irregularities and charges of voter fraud led to the announcement of a thorough investigation following the June 2014 runoff. In July 2014, the Afghan Independent Election Commission was charged with  validating the results. U.N. observers were also sent to monitor and advise the process.  An announcement was expected in late August.  But the entrenched political camps began staking out hardened positions making any announcement  about the next president likely to spark a violent response.  It became imperative to make every effort to not ignite a violent reaction to the electoral process so highly touted as “democratic”.  (Even though Karzai’s operatives were engaged at multiple levels in the voter process.) While the work of the Commission was to send a message that Afghanistan was capable of the democratic process, in reality it was doubtful any audit would produce accurate results. What ensued in June, July, August, and September was an integrated paralysis of the Afghan government threatening the already fragile future of the state.  Still, given the situation, the appearance of democracy was preferable over outright conflict, so the Commission worked. The delay in a new government stalled not only the Afghan political process.  It also further complicated the role of the United States in the post-2014 relationship with Afghanistan. The now outdated phrase “global war on terror” that brought the U.S. to Afghanistan needed to be renegotiated.  Karzai had refused to sign any bilateral agreement following the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces (joined by the majority of support systems that littered the Afghanistan landscape). It can be easily overlooked that the United States has maintained a military presence in Afghanistan since 2001.  For the past thirteen years, support systems have been integrated in to the country sides and urban areas to fight the terrorists and support the flailing Kabul government.  For the Afghans, withdrawing the visible signs of U.S. involvement in their country is a double-edged sword. While the Afghans might feel a sense of “getting their country back”, the impending security vacuum is acutely felt.  President Karzai chose to relegate the decision about U.S. forces remaining in Afghanistan to his successor which worked both for and against Afghanistan. The departure of President Hamid Karzai has been as complex as his tenure.   As much as this man was maligned, he did attempt to lead his nation but was unable to exercise sufficient political muscle to rally a cross-tribal coalition. His entanglements with other power brokers left him politically anemic.  And the rumors of either a mental illness or drug addiction reduced his stature in many circles; both at home and with international partners. Karzai was a mercurial partner, duplicitous at worst; incapable or confused at best.  Actually, his leadership skills served more of a mirror during one of Afghanistan’s more torturous periods of history than any thing else.  His proclivity for making deals that profited from the U.S. presence lined the pockets of his kin, his friends, and his enemies. The unfortunate reality is that an absence of warfare was wrested out of the conflict-ridden zones with bribes and payoffs. Today the prospects for Afghanistan are uncertain.  On September 21, Ghani was announced the winner of the June runoff and named president.  The details  of the Commissions work are mired in a need to get Afghanistan moving again.  A deal wrought by the efforts of U.S. Secretary John Kerry obtained the concurrence of the two rivals to share power in the new government.  Kerry who has long been attentive to the political realities in Afghanistan had two partners to work with in both Ghani and Abdullah.  Still, Secretary Kerry deserves much credit for seeing this deal arise at such a consequential moment.  It is presumed that the agreement was reached for the good of the country.

The New Afghanistan Government

Ghani, will hold the title of president and the military will be under his command.  Abdullah will fill a new position, that of Chief Executive.  It is hoped that Abdullah will function in many respects as a prime minister but that remains to be seen.  Ghani for his part is a consummate politician with a flare for diplomacy.  His experience at the World Bank will serve him well as the country seeks some economic footing.  But domestically, he will have to prove himself to Abdullah’s supporters as well as Mr. Abdullah himself.  Abdullah has long sought to steer the future of Afghanistan but does not retain the connections necessary to assume the top position. There is no doubt about it, these two men have the best interest for their nation.  But it would be foolish to overlook how oppositional their approach can be and how their loyalists will continue to vie for power within the government.  Both will sit on the Afghanistan National Security Council, where Abdullah may exercise his considerable “street credibility” in opposition of some of the more “high minded” supporters of Ghani. The potential for continued encampment between the supporters of these two men makes for a precarious power sharing agreement. Forging ahead will be like walking through an overgrown land mine field.  But there is one pressing external force that will be prodding them both to go forward.  That external force is the implosion out of Iraq.  The events in Iraq’s failed unity government literally brought the ISIS terrorists to the doorstep of Baghdad.  The security of Iraq as a whole is in jeopardy and the region is like a tinder box waiting for the match.  It is possible that these two rational figures, albeit rivals, will summon the courage and wisdom to work in collaboration instead of fostering sedition.  The story of Iraq lurks around every corner in Afghanistan these days.  It is in the hands of two rivals whether or not the nation finds the vision to move forward or disintegrates in to scenario that looks more like Iraq.  It would be a shame given the shared talent, education, experience, and good-will with the people that the two men share in common.  The power sharing arrangement is, at a minimum, an interesting prospect.  History will decide whether or not Afghanistan found its footing or completely lost it under this government.  But given the situation in Iraq, the world would do well to hope the best for this new government.  It would be most challenging to see two nation-states, in neighboring proximity destabilizing, fragmenting on all fronts, and contending with a terrorist threat that has benefited from a decade of adapting. This is something that both Ghani and Abdullah must weigh.  For today, their future remains an interesting prospect. (It was announced on September 30, 2014 that the bi-lateral security deal was signed between the new Afghan government and the United States).